Whose Black Politics?
Cases in Post-Racial Black Leadership

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures x
Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 1
ANDRA GILLESPIE

1 Meet the New Class: Theorizing Young Black Leadership in a “Postracial” Era 9
ANDRA GILLESPIE

PART I
Creating Opportunity: How Young Black Politicians Break Into the Political Scene 43

2 Racial Authenticity and Redistricting: A Comparison of Artur Davis’s 2000 and 2002 Congressional Campaigns 45
ANDRA GILLESPIE AND EMMA TOLBERT

3 Losing and Winning: Cory Booker’s Ascent to Newark’s Mayoralty 67
ANDRA GILLESPIE

PART II
Inheritance and Governance: What Black Political Scions Do Once They Get Elected 85

4 Like Father, Like Son? Jesse Jackson Jr.’s Tenure as a U.S. Congressman 87
RANDOLPH BURNSIDE AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ

Appendix 4.1 Categorization of CBC Members by Phase, 110th–111th Congress 102
Appendix 4.2 Repeat Legislation by Jesse Jackson Jr. 102
# Contents

5 **Hype, Hip-Hop, and Heartbreak: The Rise and Fall of Kwame Kilpatrick**  
ATHENA KING, TODD SHAW, AND LESTER SPENCE

PART III  
The Rise of Barack Obama and Its Implications for Black Politics

6 **The Burden of Jekyll and Hyde: Barack Obama, Racial Identity, and Black Political Behavior**  
LORRIE FRASURE

7 **Leadership, Legitimacy, and Public Perceptions of Barack Obama**  
CHARLTON MCILWAIN

PART IV  
New Perspectives on Deracialization

8 **Between Generations: Deval Patrick’s Election as Massachusetts’ First Black Governor**  
ANGELA K. LEWIS

9 **The Declining Significance of Race: Adrian Fenty and the Smooth Electoral Transition**  
RACHEL YON

10 **Situational Deracialization, Harold Ford, and the 2006 Senate Race in Tennessee**  
SEKOU FRANKLIN

11 **The “Steele Problem” and the New Republican Battle for Black Votes: Legacy, Loyalty, and Lexicon in Maryland’s 2006 Senate Contest**  
TYSON D. KING-MEADOWS

PART V  
Intersectionality and African-American Politics in the Twenty-First Century

12 **Race, Religion, and Post-9/11 America: The Election of Keith Ellison**  
ANDRA GILLESPIE AND AMBER PEREZ
13 Young, Gifted, Black, and Female: Why Aren’t There More Yvette Clarkes in Congress?  293
KATRINA GAMBLE

Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here?  309
ANDRA GILLESPIE

Contributors  319
Index  321
6 The Burden of Jekyll and Hyde
Barack Obama, Racial Identity, and Black Political Behavior

Lorrie Frasure

Today, we popularly know Barack Obama as a man at the top of his game, the man with adoring worldwide audiences who shattered racial barriers on his way to the White House. However, less than a decade before his historic 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama was a little known Illinois State Senator who got his hat handed to him by a Black incumbent in a congressional primary.

In 2000, Barack Obama challenged Bobby Rush for the Democratic nomination in the Illinois First Congressional District. This historic district has been represented by a Black member of Congress since 1928, when Oscar DePriest became the first Black elected to Congress in the twentieth century. Obama ran a classic Ivy League Upstart race, charging that his opponent could have done more to help the district and proposing great technocratic ideas to demonstrate his higher legislative acumen. The Black voters in Chicago’s South Side were not convinced, though. Satisfied with Rush’s leadership in Congress, they delivered him the nomination by a two-to-one margin.

Just four years later, though, the same set of voters would rally around Barack Obama as he sought the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate. How could such a thing happen? What factors explain the shift in Black public opinion and subsequent overwhelming turnout favoring Barack Obama? In this chapter, Lorrie Frasure provides a closer examination of the nuanced nature of Black electoral politics. Frasure uses Obama’s early political campaigns as a lens through which to examine Black constituent attitudes and political behavior in an era of post-Civil Rights Black political leadership. Her analysis suggests that shifts in Black electoral support for Obama are much more complex than factors related to racial identity alone. Frasure also examines the role of political information and candidate electability on Black political behavior and explores how these factors continued to shape Obama’s relationship to the Black electorate during his 2008 presidential election campaign.
Introduction

Securing enough delegates to win the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination in June 2008, Senator Barack Obama became the first African American to be nominated by a major political party in the United States. The meteoric rise of Obama to the top of the Democratic presidential ticket is a remarkable moment in U.S. history and politics, but this journey is also a lens through which to examine the intersections of racial identity, political information, and political behavior in an era of post-Civil Rights Black political leadership in the United States. Barack Obama’s introduction to the national stage followed a well-executed and widely praised July 2004 Democratic National Convention speech in Boston, followed by his decisive election to the U.S. Senate from Illinois later that year. Obama became the third African-American U.S. Senator elected since Reconstruction, and only the fifth in American history. However, much of the widespread media coverage concerning Obama’s “iconic” or “rock-star” ascent into the political spotlight and the American consciousness began with Obama’s political campaign against Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton during the 2008 primary election season.

Arguably, it is Obama’s early political life in Illinois which uniquely enhances our ability to advance the study of Black political behavior. Numerous questions remain unanswered concerning which factors explain dramatic shifts in Black support for Barack Obama, from a failed attempt to secure a nomination for a seat in the U.S. Congress in a majority Black Chicago district in 2000; to winning overwhelming general election support from the Black electorate during his successful bid for U.S. Senate in 2004; to having to wrestle the Black voting bloc away from Hillary Clinton during the 2008 presidential primaries on his way to becoming the first African-American Democratic presidential nominee and winner in 2008.

During the 2008 presidential primaries, a number of political commentators, Black elites, and academics stirred debate concerning the influence of Obama’s racial authenticity, and the extent to which the Black electorate may or may not have supported his political campaigns, in part, because he was “not Black enough” (McIlwain 2007; Walters 2007; Crouch 2006; Dickerson 2006; Giles 2007; Hansen 2007; Valbrun 2007). Though such sentiments were often dismissed as divisive media hype, questions concerning Obama’s racial authenticity, in fact, were a common feature throughout each one of his political campaigns dating back to his first Illinois State Senate race in 1996, and they were greatly popularized during the early months of the 2008 presidential primaries against Senator Hillary Clinton. Ron Walters (2007) argues, “it is legitimate that Black Americans raise questions about ‘Blackness’ as an objective issue, because it is the core concept that defines the basic cultural identity of Black people…his [Obama’s] identity omitted many of the cultural markers with which Blacks are more familiar to the extent that it has promoted a curiosity of ‘cultural fit’ that in turn has become an issue of political trust” (12). Walters, further commenting on Obama and the presidential primaries suggests,
this perceived lack of credibility in Obama’s group or cultural identity affects the confidence of many potential Black voters in his political accountability to their agenda. In this context, whether Obama looks Black, or who his ancestors were, matters, but ultimately less than his commitment to Black interests, and Blacks have historically been cautious about the issue of group representation. (2007, 13)

From his Illinois State Senate run to his bid for the Democratic nomination for president, Obama has arguably led a series of deracialized political campaigns. During a 2007 interview, Obama contended,

In the history of African-American politics in this country there has always been some tension between speaking in universal terms and speaking in very race-specific terms about the plight of the African-American community... by virtue of my background, I am more likely to speak in universal terms. (Crowley and Johnson 2007)

Despite Obama’s liberal voting record on matters from civil rights to women’s rights, his White crossover appeal and penchant for building broad coalitions across race/ethnicity, class, gender, and party lines has also presented problems for Obama and heightened questions concerning his perceived willingness to position the interests of African Americans into his public policy agenda (see Burnside and Whitehurst 2007 for an examination of Obama’s record as an Illinois State Senator).

Largely unexamined is the extent to which Obama’s initial lack of widespread Black support stemmed from factors related not only to racial identity and perceived accountability to Black interests, but also factors such as political information and political orientations. In order to better understand the influence of racial and political identity, political information, and sociodemographics on political attitudes and behavior toward Black candidates in the post-Civil Rights era, this study uses a mixed method approach, including pre-election and exit poll results, newspaper reports, as well as data from the 2004 Illinois Senate Pre-election Study. I examine the influence of these factors through the lens of three early political campaigns of Barack Obama in Illinois: the 2000 primary election for the U.S. Congress; the 2004 U.S. Senate primary election; and the 2004 U.S. Senate general election. I address the following research questions: (1) Which factors led to Obama’s 2000 primary defeat for the U.S. Congress? (2) Which factors influenced a dramatic shift in Black support for Obama during his winning 2004 U.S. Senate primary race? (3) Which factors influenced a vote for Obama in the 2004 U.S. Senate general election, including how the salience of these factors varies by race? I use a mixed method approach to examine these complex questions because there is a lack of systematic empirical data on the early political campaigns of Obama. This makes it difficult to measure the influence of factors related to racial and political identity, political information, and other factors using a single methodology.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. The next section provides a brief review of literature related to racial identity, political information and Black political participation. The third section uses polling data and newspaper reports to provide an overview of Obama’s Illinois Congressional and Senate races. In this section, I detail some factors related to Obama’s personal background because these characteristics have often served as perceived limitations or strengths in his ability to gain Black and non-Black support during his previous political campaigns. In addition to polling data and newspaper reports used to examine Obama’s US Senate primary and general election campaigns, I present some preliminary results from the 2004 Illinois Senate Pre-election Survey, used to construct a multivariate logistic regression analysis of the influence of racial and political identity, political information, along with some standard sociodemographic controls on respondents’s intentions to vote for Barack Obama in 2004. The concluding section discusses the persistent influence and development of racial identity on support for Obama during the 2008 Democratic presidential campaign.

**Racial Group Identity, Political Information and Political Participation**

Barack Obama, like many other twenty-first century Black political leaders who share similar characteristics of having grown up in the post-Civil Rights era, lived in predominantly White or mixed neighborhoods, attended predominately White colleges/universities, and whose political campaigns achieved notable White crossover appeal, has operated in a contested political space between what is deemed “good” or “just” versus what is deemed “bad” or “unjust” in relation to the African-American community. These post-Civil Rights Black political leaders are seemingly plagued by the dilemma of “Jekyll and Hyde politics.” Robert Louis Stevenson published the *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* in 1886, which recounts the classic, yet tragic tale of the struggle between good and bad.² Dawson, Brown, and Allen (1990) assert that:

> to the extent that Black life chances have been historically dominated by the ascriptive factor of race, individual African Americans have been able to use the heuristic of an evaluation of what is “good” or “bad” for the race as a proxy for maximizing individual utility. As long as the perception remains that race is more important than other factors such as social class or gender in influencing life changes, one would expect relatively homogenous group beliefs and behaviors. This perception and the associated heuristic would facilitate the processing of information through the racial-identity belief system. (25)

It is therefore plausible that the personas of good and bad imposed upon Barack Obama from those engaging in “Jekyll and Hyde politics” attempt to paint him as a creature of “two faces,” where “not Black enough” is the “bad” Obama and
“Black like me” is the “good” Obama, utilizing such markers as cues toward Black political attitudes and behaviors.

In the *Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream*, Obama wrote that

it is not easy for Black politicians to find the right tone—“too angry? not angry enough?”—when discussing the hardships of their constituents. Even the most fair-minded of Whites...those who would genuinely like to see racial inequality ended and poverty relieved, tend to push back against suggestions of racial victimization—or race-specific claims based on the history of race discrimination in this country. (Obama 2006, 247)

Clearly, then, Jekyll and Hyde politics rubs both ways, as Obama has simultaneously confronted the *inverse* of the African-American racial identity cue among segments of the White electorate, whereas a perception of “too Black” or having a policy agenda too closely aligned with African Americans is the “bad” Obama, while putting forth a universalistic policy agenda which transcends race is the “good” Obama.

Numerous studies have found that voters often cast their vote along racial lines, underscoring the relationship between racial identity cues and political participation (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989, Tate 1993, Dawson 1994, Williams 1990). In the study of Black political participation, it is generally assumed that Black voters will vote for Black candidates. As Philpot and Walton (2007) suggest, “regardless of support from White voters, African American candidates typically rely on overwhelming support from Black voters to get elected” (50). Tate’s (1993) analysis using data from the 1984–1988 National Black Election Study (NBES), found support for the influence of racial identification on Black political behavior, showing that “Strong race-identifiers were more likely to participate in electoral politics and to support Jesse Jackson’s presidential bids than weak race-identifiers” (165). Dawson, Brown, and Allen (1990) argue that,

political candidates who invoke African American racial identity in their campaigns either explicitly or implicitly, ceteris paribus, can expect increased political mobilization from a Black community that collectively and individually perceived increased group benefits from the results of a successful campaign. Conversely, candidates who base their campaigns in part on what are perceived as attacks on the Black community will also invoke the racial-identity belief system in African Americans, this amplifying Black counter mobilization to a candidate who is perceived to threaten the group interests of African Americans. (25)

Thus, the fact that the Black voting bloc seemed slow to warm to Obama’s presidential candidacy created a quandary for the study of Black political behavior.

For over thirty years, much of the existing literature on Black political participation holds that accounting for socioeconomic factors such as income and
education, Blacks participate in some political activities at much the same or at even higher rates than Anglo-Whites (Olsen 1972; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Guterbock and London 1983; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Dawson, Brown, and Allen 1990). These racial differences have often been attributed to theories of racial group identity among African Americans. Shingles (1981) expanded the model of Black political participation based on the group consciousness theory. His explanations of the political overrepresentation of Blacks closely follow the Black consciousness theories of Verba and Nie (1972). Shingles defined Black consciousness as “the awareness among Blacks of their shared status as an unjustly deprived and oppressed group” (Shingles 1981, 77). He also argues that Black consciousness impacts political participation because “it constitutes to the combination of a sense of [high] political efficacy and political mistrust which in turn induces political involvement” (Shingles 1981, 77; see Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Gurin et al. 1989). However, Tate (1991) suggests that since findings from early scholars were largely based on data from the 1960s and early 1970s, the effects of these findings may be a function of the political climate or protest atmosphere of the era, calling into question the extent to which racial group consciousness still works to politically mobilize Blacks (1162; also see Tate 1993, 79).

Nevertheless, in some key ways, Tate’s (1993) study of Black political participation found support for a “group consciousness” among Blacks surveyed. She writes, “not only does a majority (75 percent) feel that their lives are affected by what happens to Blacks as a group, but many also think about what it means to be Black today. Together, the centrality of racial group membership among Blacks accounts for much of their liberal profiles and political identities as Democrats” (Tate 1993, 165). Dawson (1994) employed a Black utility heuristic, or notion of linked fate, to determine the extent to which African Americans perceive that their own self-interest relates to the racial group interests of Blacks as a whole (see chapter 3). Dawson (1994) finds that Black institutions help to reinforce Blacks’ group identity and behavior by emphasizing racial group identity over class group identity among Blacks. This modeling strategy focuses on “group-oriented attitudes that are more relevant to Black participation than the general orientation typically employed in analyses of Anglo participation” (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999, 1095, note).

While these theories have been instrumental in understanding Black political participation, they may not account for evolving dimensions of Black political behavior.

Obama’s political campaigns provide an opportunity to better understand the intersections of racial identity, political information, and political behavior. One’s information context may include avenues for accessing political information, knowledge of and interests in politics and public affairs, or the extent to which an individual is contacted by a political campaign or even the type of neighborhood in which one lives. Such contexts are important because they are believed to be prerequisites for political efficacy (or the perception that one has the ability to influence the political system). Diana Mutz (1993) writes, “those with high levels of political knowledge, heavy use of mass media, high levels of
political interest, and regular involvement in the political process are expected to differ in their decision-making processes from those who are less knowledgeable, less educated, less interested, or less involved” (483–84).

In short, people with high levels of political information, knowledge, and awareness are thought to vote differently from those with low levels; and these individuals are better equipped to form opinions that are consistent with their political predispositions (Converse 1962; Zaller 1991, 1992). Converse (1962) evaluated how some values constrain mass opinion. His work suggests that people rely on contextual information presented to them via political cues from elites to process new ideas. While some individuals are ill-informed, they often take “shortcuts” to make up for their lack of information and knowledge by employing political cues, which come largely from political elites. These cues in turn help them to form positions on issues that are consistent with their political views (Zaller 1991, 1992).

These factors may be particularly important to the study of Black political behavior in the post-Civil Rights era. We still have very little knowledge of the influence of racial and political identity cues as well as political information related to how Black voters will respond to various types of African-American political campaigns, including those involving two or more Black candidates from the same party; two Black candidates from different political parties; or when a Black male candidate opposes a non-Black female candidate for elected office. An analysis of Obama’s early political campaigns is uniquely suitable to begin to unpack some of these concerns.

The Early Political Campaigns of Barack Obama

This study uses a mixed method approach that includes preelection and exit poll results, newspaper reports, as well as data from the 2004 Illinois Senate Study, to examine the following research questions: (1) Which factors led to Obama’s 2000 primary defeat for the U.S. Congress? (2) Which factors influenced a dramatic shift in Black support for Obama during his 2004 U.S. Senate primary race? (3) Which factors influenced a vote for Obama in the 2004 U.S. Senate general election, including how the salience of these factors varied by race? Using a variety of sources assists in explaining a more nuanced narrative of the events of Obama’s political campaigns. The next section analyzes the early political campaigns of Barack Obama, starting with his bid for U.S. Congress, followed by his bid for the U.S. Senate. Then, I summarize and discuss preliminary results from the 2004 Illinois Senate Study used to construct a multivariate logistic regression model of the relationships between racial and political identity, political information, along with some standard demographic controls on Black and White respondent’s intention to cast a vote for Obama versus Keyes in 2004.

Obama and the Race for U.S. Congress

In 2000, after having served in the Illinois State Senate since 1997, Obama ran for the U.S. Congress in an attempt to unseat former Black Panther and long-time
Democratic incumbent Representative Bobby L. Rush. Despite the fact that Rush’s seat in Congress seemed politically vulnerable following his unsuccessful attempt to defeat Richard M. Daley, the long-time incumbent Mayor of Chicago, Rush defeated Obama in a landslide victory of 60 percent to 31 percent (Federal Elections Commission 2000). Obama won the White vote, which made up 30 percent of the electorate, but lost the Black vote, which was a necessary voting bloc toward winning in this predominantly Black Congressional district (Federal Elections Commission 2000; Scott 2007, 5; also see Obama 2006, 105–107 for a personal account of the 2000 Congressional race).

Obama was successfully painted by Rush as an elitist, opportunistic, outsider, who was too inexperienced and was “out of touch” with Chicagoans in the majority Black, South-side district. Obama’s campaign for U.S. Congress was plagued with questions concerning whether he was “Black enough” to be trusted to represent the interests of the district he sought to represent (Scott 2007, 1). To be sure, Obama did not fit the model of traditional Black political leaders in Chicago such as Rush, Jesse Jackson Sr., or Harold Washington, the city’s first Black mayor. Born in 1961, Obama was only four years old when Malcolm X was assassinated and six when Martin Luther King was assassinated. He was in his twenties when Harold Washington, who was elected mayor in 1983, died suddenly of a heart attack in 1987. Obama’s autobiography, Dreams of My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance (1995, 2006), recounts the story of his biracial heritage and upbringing in Hawaii and Indonesia. His White mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, was from Kansas, and his father was a Kenyan, Barack Obama Sr., who abandoned his family to pursue his studies at Harvard when Obama was a toddler. His mother remarried and later divorced an Indonesian, Lolo Soetoro, and Obama was raised in Hawaii by his maternal grandparents Madelyn, whom he called Tutu or Toot and Stanley whom he called Gramps. He attended Occidental College in Los Angeles and graduated from Columbia University in New York with a degree in political science. Prior to attending law school at Harvard University, where he became the first Black editor of the Harvard Law Review, Obama served as a community organizer on Chicago’s South side. In 1992, he married Michelle Robinson, an African-American native Chicagoan, who was also a Harvard Law graduate and his former mentor, whom he met while he worked as a summer associate at a corporate law firm in Chicago. Obama returned to Chicago after law school, reportedly turning down many prestigious jobs in corporate America to follow his political aspirations.

While this story is fascinating for many, the fact that Barack Obama, an unfamiliar if not “funny” name at the outset, was interracial, graduated from Columbia and Harvard universities, lived in Hyde Park (a racially mixed, largely middle- to upper-middle class neighborhood in Chicago), and taught constitutional law at the University of Chicago, an institution known for less than harmonious ties with the surrounding Black community on Chicago’s South Side, made it easier for Rush to tarnish Obama’s reputation and bring into question his authenticity as a Black candidate who could best serve the interests of a majority Black district (Obama 1995, 2006; Mendell 2007). Despite Obama’s
work as a community organizer since 1991, he did not have the upbringing, age, or track record of traditional civil rights activism to mount a successful campaign against a well-liked and well-connected Black incumbent like Bobby Rush. What is more, Obama’s inability to connect with and appear relatable to Black Chicagoans beyond the corners of the Hyde Park and wealthy Lake Front neighborhoods reportedly made him less favorable to Blacks on the campaign trail (Scott 2007, 5).

On the other hand, Representative Rush was a long time Chicago politician with strong ties to the Black Civil Rights Movement establishment, and was endorsed by many of its leaders, such as Jesse Jackson Sr. Rush also had a strong relationship with the Clintons and his political campaign benefited from an endorsement from President Bill Clinton in 2000. Following his loss, Obama told the Chicago Tribune, “there were elements within the African American community who might have suggested ‘Well, he’s from Hyde Park’ or ‘He went to Harvard’ or ‘He was born in Hawaii, so he might not be Black enough’” (Fletcher 2007, 3). Obama admits that perhaps he miscalculated the favorability of Rush among the district’s constituency. He garnered only 11 percent name recognition to Rush’s 90 percent six months prior to the primary election and thus, arguably, the Black electorate never got a chance to know him (Obama 2006, 105–107). While the race was about an emerging leader versus an incumbent leader, rife with calls for “change,” Obama never posed a viable threat to Rush, who never lost his lead as the frontrunner. Moreover, Obama had no way of knowing that the turn of events that would strengthen Rush’s relationship with the district’s Black electorate. Rush’s 29-year-old son Huey died tragically as a result of random gun violence in October 1999. Rush’s favorability was boosted by the so-called sympathy vote. Concomitantly, Obama’s failure to return to the Illinois Senate from a Christmas vacation in Hawaii, due to his daughter’s illness, caused him to miss an important vote on a crime bill that failed to pass by five votes. It was the combination of these factors that led to Obama’s defeat by Congressman Rush in 2000 (Obama 2006, 106).

**Obama and the Race for U.S. Senate**

Obama learned many lessons from his failed U.S. Congress bid. The next time around, Obama was better prepared and politically connected, benefiting from sound political calculations, and knowledgeable, well-connected allies. He reportedly started campaigning for his Senate seat more than eighteen months prior to the primary election. However, while he worked diligently to build coalitions across race, class, and gender lines, in February, one month prior to the U.S. Senate primary, Chicago Tribune/WGN-TV news polls showed Obama with only 15 percent of the likely Democratic vote (Pearson 2004). African-American voters in Illinois were a particularly important voting bloc, accounting for about 23 percent of Democratic likely primary voters. For a short time, it seemed that Obama’s primary race may have been plagued with racial identity ghosts, similar to his Congressional bid. In fact, Chicago Tribune/WGN-TV news polls showed
Table 6.1 Percent of Democratic Primary Likely Voters for Barack Obama, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Dates</th>
<th>All Democrats</th>
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<th>African American Democrats</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Obama</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 6-11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 11-17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3-6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Market Share Corp. poll conducted among Democratic likely voters prior to the March 17, 2004 primary. Margin of error is +/-4 percentage points.

that one month before the Senate Democratic Primary only 38 percent of likely African-American voters supported him (Pearson 2004).

Table 6.1 provides polling results of several hundred Democratic likely voters as well as a breakdown of African-American voters’ support for Obama, revealing a progressive rise in support for Obama over the course of the primary campaign. The Chicago Tribune/WGN-TV poll taken in January 2004 found that only 14 percent of all Democratic likely voters surveyed would vote for Obama. In February, this number rose to 15 percent and in March, less than two weeks before the primary election, this number rose to 33 percent. Among African-American Democratic likely voters, Obama’s poll numbers grew from 29 percent in January, to 38 percent in February, and 62 percent in March. What factors account for this shift in support?

For weeks, wealthy and well-known businessman Blair Hull led the Senate primary race, averaging about 25 percent of the likely vote in the polls. Then, allegations of domestic abuse surfaced involving his ex-wife, thus derailing his Senate primary campaign. These allegations worked to Obama’s political fortune and contributed to his ability to pull ahead a few weeks before the primary. Obama and his campaign advisor David Axelrod scrambled to get Obama on television to increase his visibility among Illinois voters. The campaign ran a series of television ads featuring the late Chicago Mayor Harold Washington and the late U.S. Senator Paul Simon. These ads served to raise Obama’s visibility and to introduce him to a larger portion of the Illinois electorate. Chicago Tribune pollster Nick Panagakis attributed the doubling of African-American voter support, in part, to the increased name recognition and visibility of Obama during the later stages of the primary campaign. In January and February, Obama was familiar to 51 percent and 52 percent of Illinois Black voters. By March, Obama was familiar to 72 percent of Black voters in Illinois. Obama’s campaign was also aided by big endorsements from the Chicago Tribune and Sun-Times, Sheila Simon, daughter of Paul Simon, and basketball legend, Michael Jordan. On Primary Election Day, Obama received 54 percent of the overall Democratic vote. Obama’s primary campaign won 66 percent of the Chicago vote, including 90 percent of the Black vote in Chicago, 61 percent of suburban Cook County, and 56 to 64 percent in three key counties: DuPage, Kane, and Lake (Panagakis 2004).
The 2004 Senate general election became increasingly peculiar, including another series of events which worked in Obama's political favor. Similar to Obama’s chief primary election opponent Blair Hull, the Republican general election front-runner, Jack Ryan, also withdrew from the race in light of allegations concerning a personal scandal involving his ex-wife. In August 2004, Republicans surprisingly selected former Reagan diplomat and conservative radio talk show host Alan Keyes to replace Jack Ryan on the Republican ticket. Keyes moved to Illinois from Maryland in August, a few months prior to the election, to lead the Republican ticket.

With the selection of Alan Keyes, the U.S. Senate race became especially historic because it included two African-American candidates who were backed by the major political parties and running in districts that were not majority Black (Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007, 38; Jackson 2006). In the general election, Obama painted Keyes as an interloping carpetbagger shipped in from Maryland in an attempt to steal the general election. Ironically, Obama used an “outsider” stamp similar to the one which Bobby Rush had placed on him four years earlier. However, Keyes, aware of Obama's perceived racial identity problems, “played the race card” on repeated occasions. He attacked Obama’s racial identity and background and touted his “more authentic” roots in the African-American community. During a nationally televised interview with ABC-TV news reporter George Stephanopoulos, Alan Keyes stated,

Barack Obama claims an African-American heritage…Barack Obama and I have the same race—that is, physical characteristics. We are not from the same heritage…. My ancestors toiled in slavery in this country…. My consciousness, who I am as a person, has been shaped by my struggle, deeply emotional and deeply painful, with the reality of that heritage. (Chase and Ford 2004)

In another televised U.S. Senate debate in Illinois, Keyes suggested that race should be important to the voters suggesting, “Race is involved in this in one way because the heritage that people have has a bearing on who they are and what they consider to be important” (Chase and Ford 2004).

Obama responded to these remarks stating, “I guess Mr. Keyes started off making a point that he's somehow more authentically African-American than I am…. You know, I obviously find that offensive” (Chase and Ford 2004).

Despite Keyes’s name recognition and use of racial identity politics against Obama, he lost an uphill battle which was never in his favor. Keyes’s political stances on issues from gay marriage to abortion rights aligned with much of the Republican Party ideology. However, the public delivery of his viewpoints and his shock-jock radio persona while on the campaign trail did not fare well with most Illinois voters, Republican or Democrat. Keyes’s racial, religious, and moral attacks seemed to be largely ignored by the Obama campaign. One week after his selection as Republican nominee, Chicago Tribune polls showed Keyes down by 41 points (Sector 2004). While Keyes was well known by state likely
voters at 91 percent, he was not well liked (20 percent favorable vs. 42 percent unfavorable). By mid-October his name recognition grew, but among likely voters his favorability ratings fell (15 percent favorable versus 51 percent unfavorable). Among African-American voters from mid-August to mid-October, Keyes favorability scores went from 3 percent to 7 percent favorable, and 65 percent to 69 percent unfavorable. On the other hand, Obama’s name recognitions rose from 96 percent to 99 percent among total likely voters, with a favorability rating of 62 percent to 65 percent favorable, and 14 percent to 15 percent unfavorable. Keyes favorable/unfavorable ratings among Republicans went from 33 percent/35 percent in August to 32 percent/35 percent in October 2004 (Panagakis 2004). In November 2004, Obama defeated Keyes 70 percent to 27 percent—the widest margin in Illinois history (CNN 2004). Obama won the support of nine out of ten Black voters and seven out of ten White voters. Obama received 92 percent of the Black vote and 66 percent of the White vote. Keyes received 8 percent of the Black and 31 percent of the White vote.

Despite such a wide margin of support favoring Obama, this election still posed questions regarding the intersections of race, party identification, religiosity, political information and political behavior, providing a unique opportunity to examine these factors among Black and White Illinois respondents who were presented with the electoral choice of two African-American candidates from different political parties. However, despite Alan Keyes’s highly unfavorable ratings among both Whites and Blacks and the persistent divisions within the Illinois Republican Party over his placement on the ticket, it is also interesting to examine why Keyes still managed to garner about one-third of the White vote in Illinois, including 33 percent of all White men. Exit polls show that Keyes received over a third of the Protestant vote. In fact, 77 percent of all White, conservative Protestant voters cast a ballot for Keyes, while Obama received 18 percent of this demographic. In order to gain a better understanding of these election results, the next section uses preelection data from the 2004 Illinois Senate Pre-Election Study to predict which factors influenced an intention to vote for Obama versus Keyes among both Black and White voters during the 2004 U.S. Senate general election.5

Predicting Electoral Behavior in the 2004 Senate Race among Black and White Illinois Voters

The 2004 Illinois Senate Study includes a random sample of Illinois residents interviewed in October 2004, prior to the November 2004 U.S. Senate general election. The Illinois sample consists of a random sample of respondents, with an oversample of African Americans. Data collected for the 2004 Illinois Senate Study was part of a larger survey, the 2004 Ethnic Politics Pre-Election Study (Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2004, 49).6

Table 6.2 presents the results from three multivariate logistic regression estimates for the dependent variable of the response to the question, “If the election for US Senate in Illinois were held today, who would you vote for?” (Obama = 1/
Table 6.2 Logit Model of Likelihood of Intention to Vote for Barack Obama, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model I (Full)</th>
<th>Model II (Whites)</th>
<th>Model III (Blacks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>min-max</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race is Politically</td>
<td>-0.597**</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>-0.775**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Low) Interest In</td>
<td>-0.336***</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted</td>
<td>0.440*</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in White Community</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance Important</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1.334***</td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td>1.774***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.830**</td>
<td>(0.392)</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.450***</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>0.508***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.713</td>
<td>(0.843)</td>
<td>-0.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>609</td>
<td></td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-353.505</td>
<td></td>
<td>-241.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PseudoR²</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 2004 Illinois Senate Study.

Keyes = 0). Since the dependent variable measure is dichotomous, I use a logistic rather than ordinary least squares regression analysis. Because logistic regression coefficients are more difficult to interpret than ordinary least squares regression estimates, I also present predicted probabilities (under the columns “min-max”).
to understand the impact of each independent variable on the dependent measure from its minimum to maximum value. Predicted probabilities are much easier to interpret than logistic regression coefficients; unlike the regression coefficients, one can read the predicted probabilities on a scale of 0 to 1. Thus, for our purposes, if an independent variable has a predicted probability of 0.5, then a person who changes their score on that variable in question from the minimum to the maximum value, controlling for all other factors, increases their probability of intending to vote for Obama by 50 percent.

Model I presents results from the full sample of Illinois respondents. Model II presents results from White Illinois respondents. Model III presents results from Black Illinois respondents. Disaggregating the full model by race allows for a greater examination of the extent to which racial differences, between Black and White Illinois respondents, exist when declaring an intention to cast a vote for Obama versus Keyes.

The likelihood of voting for Obama versus Keyes was modeled as a function of racial identity: the perceived importance of the respondent’s racial identity to their ideas about politics (1 = very/somewhat important/0 = not at all); information context: the respondent’s interest in politics and public affairs (1 = very interested, 2 = interested, 3 = somewhat interested, 4 = not at all interested); the influence of whether the respondent lives in a predominantly White community (1 = yes/0 = no); and whether they were contacted by a political campaign prior to the election (1 = yes/0 = no); as well as religiosity: as measured by whether or not religion provides guidance in respondent’s daily life (1 = yes/0 = no). The religion control is important for this model because Keyes constantly attacked Obama on religious and moral grounds. Alan Keyes called Barack Obama to task on several occasions concerning not only his racial authenticity but also his moral and religious authenticity, stating on numerous occasions that he did not believe Jesus would support Obama because he supports abortion rights. In a televised Senate debate, Keyes stated while spreading his arms apart, “Christ is over here, Sen. Obama is over there: the two don’t look the same” (Chase and Ford 2004). I also include several standard controls including party identification of the respondent (Democrat = 1/Other = 0) and standard sociodemographic characteristics: race, income, education, age, and gender. Note that only Model I includes a measure of race (Black = 0/Other = 1).

Examining these measures of racial identity, information context, party ID, and religiosity, along with some standard demographic controls in a single model, helps us to untangle which factors influence a respondent’s intention to cast a vote for Obama versus Keyes in 2004, and the salience of these factors when the model is disaggregated by race.

First, the racial identity measure posed some interesting results. In the full model, respondents who believed that their race was important to their ideas about politics were 14 percent less likely to declare an intention to vote for Obama than those who did not believe that race was important to their ideas about politics. When the model was disaggregated by race, we find that White respondents who believed that being White is important to their ideas about politics were 19
percent less likely to declare a vote for Obama than White respondents who did not think race is important. On the other hand, Black respondents who believed that being Black is important to their ideas about politics were 37 percent more likely to declare an intention to vote for Obama than Black respondents who do not deem race as important. Interestingly, controlling for all other factors, it appears that racial identity played a role in Blacks’ and Whites’ intention to vote for Obama.

It also appears that low interest in political and public affairs was also inversely correlated with an intention to vote for Obama in the full sample. Moreover, while being contacted by a candidate or political party to vote was positively correlated with an intention to vote for Obama in the full model. Respondents in the full model with lower levels of interest in politics were 23 percent less likely to declare a vote for Obama, and respondents who were contacted were 10 percent more likely to declare a vote for Obama. However, once the model was disaggregated by race, other factors seemed to “wash away” the influence of these two factors on vote choice.

The findings regarding religiosity were also interesting. The importance of religion has played an important role in the study of political participation, particularly related to electoral mobilization and turnout among Blacks (Harris 1994; Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman, and Combs 1995; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Dawson, Brown and Allen 1990; Reese and Brown 1997; Secret, Johnson, and Forrest 1990). However, the extant research is largely silent on the relationship between religion and vote choice, particularly when choosing among two Black candidates with starkly different views on issues important to the Black religious community (Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007 are the exception). Recall that Keyes publicly challenged Obama’s moral and religious authenticity throughout the general election season (Chase and Ford 2004).

Both in the full sample and in the samples disaggregated by race, religious guidance posed a negative relationship to an intention to vote for Obama. However, this measure only reached statistical significance for Blacks. Black respondents who stated that religion is important in guiding their daily lives were 15 percent less likely to declare an intention to vote for Obama, controlling for all other factors. Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007) find somewhat similar results suggesting, “Keyes was unable to reasonably portray himself as the authentically racial candidate. Instead, Keyes was able to gain some ground among religious voters, who used religiosity rather than race as the central decision heuristic” (47).

The finding regarding party identification is somewhat unsurprising. Democrats were 28 percent more likely to declare an intention to vote for Obama than non-Democrats, and the same finding held true among White Democrats, who were 35 percent more likely to vote for Obama than White non-Democrats. However, controlling for all other factors, Black Democrats were no more or less likely to declare an intention to vote for Obama than Black non-Democrats.

Finally, the findings from the demographic measures also support the findings of Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007), who find that Blacks are more likely
to cast a vote for Obama than non-Blacks. This model shows that Blacks are 17 percent more likely to declare an intention to vote for Obama than non-Blacks. The model also shows that respondents with higher levels of educational attainment are also more likely to have declared an intention to vote for Obama than respondents with lower levels of educational attainment. Notably, the influence of education is much more salient for Black than for White respondents; while Black respondents with higher levels of education were 59 percent more likely to declare an intention to vote for Obama, White respondents with higher levels of education were only 36 percent more likely to declare a vote for Obama. Controlling for all other factors, gender, age, and income posed no statistically significant effect on respondents’ intention to vote for Obama versus Keyes in 2004.

Results from statistical analysis, while complex, suggest that racial differences, including factors related to one’s racial identity, played a role in shaping political behavior for Blacks and Whites in 2004. Religion and educational attainment also served a role in shaping Black political behavior during the 2004 Senate race.

Beyond Illinois: Racial Identity, Electability, and the 2008 Presidential Election

This chapter used Obama’s early political campaigns as a lens through which to examine Black constituent attitudes and behavior in an era of post-Civil Rights Black political leadership in the United States. While Black voters rejected Obama’s bid during the 2000 Congressional race against an African American male Democrat, Black voters overwhelmingly supported him in his 2004 Senate race against an African-American male Republican. Obama’s moderate use of racial identity cues and universalistic policy stances upset his electoral chances to capture a Congressional seat at the more racially homogenous district level. But eventually, Black voters saw his moderation as an asset when he pursued statewide office for the U.S. Senate. In addition, this study suggests that shifts in Black electoral support for Obama are much more complex than factors related to racial identity alone.

Obama’s relationship with the Black electorate was also seemingly strengthened by factors related to political information and knowledge as well as candidate electability. Obama entered the Congressional race in 2000 with only six months to attempt to defeat Bobby Rush, a well-liked, well-established political giant on Chicago’s Black South Side, leaving him little time to raise money, gain name recognition, connect with Black voters and ultimately get out the vote in his favor. After a devastating loss, Obama ran for the U.S. Senate and subsequently for president having learned valuable rules along the political road. He reportedly started campaigning for U.S. Senate more than 18 months prior to the primary election. Moreover, beyond benefiting from the personal scandals of his opponents, which helped to propel him to frontrunner status, he was successful in increasing his visibility among Illinois voters, including the Black electorate, with television ads featuring well-known political figures in Illinois and in the
Chicago area. This exposure, coupled with numerous celebrity endorsements, helped to position Obama as a viable contender and ultimately a winner of the Democratic nomination and later the U.S. Senate seat from Illinois. While the results from the 2004 Illinois Pre-Election Study revealed that racial identity played a role in shaping Black voters’s intentions to vote for Obama for U.S. Senate, notably Obama received a helpful dose of free advertising, benefiting from a national platform during and after a well-received keynote address at 2004 Democratic National convention.

After serving as U.S. Senator from Illinois for less than three years, in February 2007, Obama entered the race for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination. Yet, it appeared that Obama’s burden of Jekyll and Hyde politics was not put to rest back in Illinois. Arguably, the Democratic primaries presented the ultimate challenge, to date, for Obama in confronting the nexus between racial identity and the support of the Black electorate. In a similar fashion to his previous campaigns, African Americans as a voting bloc did not immediately support Obama’s candidacy. When Obama found difficulty wrestling the Black voting bloc away from Hillary Clinton in the early months of the Democratic primary, questions concerning his racial identity and the extent to which Obama was “Black enough” or “too Black” garnered national media attention.

Ironically, when Blacks as a voting bloc began to turn their support toward Obama (largely following his historic win in the predominantly White Iowa Caucus and in the wake of Bill Clinton’s “fairy tale” remarks during the South Carolina Democratic primary concerning the “seriousness” of Obama as a presidential contender (Fears 2008), it was widely suggested that his newfound support, in part, stemmed from Blacks’ racial group consciousness. Media pundits espoused the idea that Blacks moved to the Obama camp because of their shared racial identity (see, for example, “Poll: Blacks Support Obama…” 2008).

Paradoxically, many of the factors that supposedly raised suspicions among the Black electorate (i.e., Obama’s White crossover appeal) during his earlier campaigns, now seemingly served as the same heuristic cue that facilitated the widespread support among the Black electorate during the 2008 Presidential primaries.

We do not yet know the extent to which a shift in Black support for Obama actually occurred because of racial identity or the role of political information and knowledge of candidate Obama. The perceived electability/viability of Obama as an African-American candidate seemed equally important to Black voters in 2008 as it did in 2004, invoking what some scholars refer to as a bandwagon effect. Herbert Simon (1954) argues that,

It is supposed that the voting behavior of at least some persons is a function of their expectations of the election outcome; published poll data are assumed to influence these expectations, hence to affect the voting behavior of these persons. If persons are more likely to vote for a candidate when they expect him to win than when they expect him to lose, we have a “bandwagon” effect.... (246)
It seems that a shift in substantial Black support for Obama took hold only after the Black electorate perceived Obama to be a viable presidential candidate. In particular, after Obama won the Iowa Caucus, it was evident that the Obama campaign had reached broad White crossover appeal. Obama won 38 percent of the Iowa caucus vote to John Edwards’s 30 percent and Hillary Clinton’s 29 percent. This result was a great blow to Hillary Clinton’s momentum and arguably, a heuristic cue to the Black electorate concerning the electability of Obama for the Democratic nomination. Tracking a few public opinion polls among Black registered voters further marks the dramatic shift in Black support for Obama post-Iowa. Two combined \textit{Washington Post-ABC} polls, taken among registered Democrats in December 2006 and January 2007 (prior to Obama’s announcement that he would run for the Democratic nomination on February 10, 2007), showed that Blacks preferred Hillary Clinton 3 to 1 over Barack Obama—60 percent to 20 percent. Two CNN/Opinion Research polls taken among Black registered Democrats before the Iowa Caucus showed Clinton leading Obama 53 percent to 36 percent and 57 percent to 33 percent (April 10–12, 2007 and October 12–14, 2007, respectively). However, a third CNN/Opinion Research poll taken January 14–17, 2008, following the Iowa Caucus on January 3, showed Obama leading Clinton among Black registered voters 59 percent to 31 percent (CNN/Opinion Research Poll: January 18, 2008). By Super Tuesday on February 5, 2008, exit polls reveal that Obama won about 82 percent of the Black vote (Balz and Cohen 2007).

Going into the general election against Republican presidential nominee Senator John McCain, Obama solidly held the Black voting bloc. In an historic victory, Obama defeated McCain in the general election to become the 44th President of the United States. Obama won 365 Electoral College votes and 53 percent of the popular vote to McCain’s 173 electoral votes and 46 percent of the popular vote. Exit poll results showed that Obama was supported by about 95 percent of Black voters, while McCain was supported by 4 percent of Black voters (CNN National Election Day Exit Poll).

Since Obama captured the national imagination in 2004, many scholars and commentators have been preoccupied with the extent to which Blacks would support his political campaigns. While his was a shorter road to the White House than most, it was not an easy road. His political story provides a nuanced view of the often not-so-monolithic Black electorate, at the local, state, and national levels. As the number of post-Civil Rights era African-American candidates increases, the role of racial identity and the extent to which candidates use deracialized campaign strategies, speak in universalistic policy terms, and seek broad support from Whites and other racial/ethnic groups will become increasingly important areas of study. The ways in which such candidates navigate the imposition of Jekyll and Hyde politics on their personal background, character, and policy agendas poses further avenues ripe for study. Such research should examine the influence of racial identity, political information, and perceptions of a candidate’s electability beyond a Black/White dichotomy toward an understanding of these factors from a comparative racial/ethnic context.
Notes

1. The author wishes to thank Jane Junn and Melissa Harris-Lacewell for the use of data from the 2004 Illinois Senate Pre-election Study. The author also thanks Nick Panagakis of the Market Shares Corp. for his polling data and useful insight on the 2004 Illinois Senate race.

2. *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, as it is popularly known, introduces us to Jekyll, a wealthy, handsome, and respected scientist. However, Jekyll is of “two-selves” for he is leading a double life. Dr. Jekyll successfully compounds a mixture, that when drunk, transforms his body into Edward Hyde, an unsightly, repulsive being that represents the pure evil dwelling within him. Dr. Jekyll is transformed once again to his original self upon drinking the same potion. For some time Jekyll indulges in his secret life and his ability to practice unspeakable acts without detection or repercussions. However, after Hyde engages in a series of crimes, including murder, Jekyll attempts to rid himself of Mr. Hyde—his evil side. Unfortunately, as the story goes, Dr. Jekyll is unable to shake Edward Hyde as his nature struggles between good and evil. As Edward Hyde struggled to overtake Jekyll’s total being, Jekyll found himself transforming into Hyde, without having drank the potion. What is more, the drug intended to transform Hyde back to Jekyll was no longer effective. Jekyll, faced with the fact that he may be forced to live out his days as Edward Hyde, tragically commits suicide.

3. More recent findings by Bledsoe et al. (1995) show that “increasing racial integration of American large cities may well reduce Black solidarity...as the numbers of Asians and Hispanics increase dramatically and increasing income undermines the sense of collective identity and fate.... Blacks living in integrated communities may be less interested in Black interests and Black candidates” (453).

4. Converse (1962), contends that individuals most susceptible to influence in a political campaign, are those of the middling level of political awareness, since they are attentive enough to absorb political information, but their knowledge of politics is not sophisticated enough to resist changing their opinions. On the other hand, the least politically aware individuals pay little attention to political cues or messages and are cut off, for one reason or the other, from most efforts of the media and other elite cues to change their opinions. Moreover, the opinions of the most aware individuals are also stable since they are sophisticated enough to guard their existing views and thus are less susceptible to change.

5. There is surprisingly little available data on the 2004 Illinois Senate race. I was fortunate to receive the unreleased data used in this study from the 2004 Illinois Senate Survey (Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2004).

6. The larger random probability sample includes interviews of equal numbers of Whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans in the United States. The survey firm Knowledge Networks of Menlo Park, California conducted self-administered surveys via the Internet. Respondents were selected for the Knowledge Networks panel using standard methods of random-digit dialing. “Respondents were selected for the study on the basis of a series of racial self-classification questions collected by Knowledge Networks in a demographic profile. In addition to the U.S. and Illinois samples, a Florida study was also fielded to capture the dynamics of the U.S. Senate race between Betty Castor and Mel Martinez” (Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007, 49).

7. See Harris-Lacewell and Junn (2007) for a somewhat similar research design and modeling strategy. However, this study disaggregates by racial/ethnic group and does not use the experimental manipulations used in the Harris-Lacewell and Junn 2007 study.

8. Interestingly, the CNN/Opinion Research poll taken in April 2007 and again after the Iowa Caucus asked if Black and White registered Democrats believed Hillary
Clinton or Barack Obama “understands the problems and concerns of Blacks.” In April 2007, 88 percent of Black registered Democrats favored Hillary Clinton on this question, as compared to only 77 percent of Black registered Democrats who favored Obama. However, after the Iowa Caucus, 82 percent of Blacks favored Obama on this question as compared to 74 percent who favored Clinton. The same CNN/Opinion poll showed that 42 percent of Blacks felt that Blacks would be better off, if Obama were elected President in November 2008, as compared to only 35 percent of Blacks who believed that Blacks would be better off, if Clinton were elected president (CNN/Opinion Research Poll: January 18, 2008). The CNN/Opinion Research Poll included 383 Black registered voters. The sampling error was +/- 5 percentage points.

References

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